Science, Spencer contends, is organized knowledge.
scientific statements have truth values in isolation. If the individuation of the items they purport to refer to --a species, or a retrovirus, for example --is provided by a theory, there may be no fact of the matter as to whether they are true independent of the theory.
Such holism might seem epistemologically innocuous. One way to accommodate it would be to take the bulk of a theory as "background knowledge" and then ask whether, together with the empirical evidence, it affords sufficient grounds to underwrite a particular claim. Given the theory and the empirical evidence, does this food sharing manifest reciprocal altruism? Although this reveals whether a theory supports a claim, it plainly does not solve our problem. For the assumption that the "background knowledge" is genuine knowledge cannot be sustained. There is no viable non-holistic explanation of how the individual sentences of the theory serving as background could have obtained the support they require to qualify as knowledge. Scientific theories are not granular in the way that epistemology takes knowledge to be.
Another, perhaps more promising strategy is to take holism at its word. The simple sentences that comprise a theory cannot be separately justified. Evidence always bears on a theory as a whole. So evidence for the claim that a given process is adiabatic is evidence for an entire theory of heat transfer, which is tested along with the claim. This is in principle epistemologically unproblematic. The contention that knowledge is propositional says nothing about the length of the propositions that constitute knowledge.
We can accommodate scientific holism by treating a theory as a conjunction of its component propositions and saying that the evidence bears on the truth or falsity of that long conjunction. If the conjunction is true, is believed, and is justified or reliably produced, it is known. This may be as good a schema for scientific knowledge as we are likely to get. But it sheds little light on the cognitive value of science, for its requirements are rarely met. In particular, the truth requirement is rarely satisfied. As will emerge, theories contain sentences that do not even purport to be true. For now, however, this complication will be ignored. Still there is a problem. For even the best scientific theories confront anomalies. They imply consequences that the evidence does not bear out. Since a conjunction is false if any of its conjuncts is, if a scientific theory is a conjunction, an anomaly, being a falsifying instance, tells decisively against the theory that generates it. Since a theory that generates an anomaly is false, its cognitive deliverance is not knowledge.
Perhaps we can evade this predicament. The characterization of a theory as a conjunction might seem to offer some hope of isolating anomalies and screening off their effects. 5 All we need to do is identify and expunge the troublesome conjuncts. Consider the following conjunction:
(1) (1) then is not something we are in a position to know.
Still, we can rescind (a), leaving (b) Sam is in New York
which is true, justified, and reliable. Since neither (a) nor the evidence for (a) lends any support to (b), (b)'s tenability is not undermined by the repudiation of (a). On standard accounts of knowledge, we are in a position to know that (b) . If the components of a scientific theory were related to one another as loosely as (a) and (b) are related in (1), we could simply rescind the anomalous sentences and be left with a justified, reliable truth -something that could be known.
But the components of a theory lack the requisite independence. A theory is a tightly interwoven tapestry of mutually supportive commitments. Simply excising anomalous sentences would leave a motheaten tapestry that would not hang together. Before Einstein, physicists devised a variety of increasingly drastic revisions in their theories to accommodate the perturbation in Mercury's orbit. But even at their most desperate, they did not suggest simply inserting an exception into the theory. Although 'All planets except Mercury have elliptical orbits' is apparently true, justified, reliably generated, and believed, it pulls so strongly against the ideal of systematicity that scientists never considered incorporating it into astronomy.
Temporarily bracketing anomalies may be a good tactic in theory development, but simply discounting them as exceptions is not. The reason is not merely aesthetic. An anomaly might be just a pesky irritation that stems from undetected but ultimately insignificant interference, but it might also, like the perturbation in Mercury's orbit, be symptomatic of a subtle but significant misunderstanding of the phenomena. Science would lose potentially valuable information if it simply dismissed its anomalies as exceptions that it need not explain. There is then no hope of simply extracting anomalous sentences without undermining the epistemic support for the rest of the theory. The theory rather than the individual sentence is the unit we need to focus on.
These points are familiar and uncontroversial, but their epistemological consequences are worth noting. A theory can be construed as a conjunction of the sentences that appear in it. But science does not yield knowledge expressed by such conjunctions. For the conjunction of the sentences that constitute a good scientific theory is apt to be false. The unavailability of sentence by sentence verification discredits the idea that science delivers knowledge of each component sentence. The hopelessness of selectively deleting falsehoods in and false implications of a theory undermines the plausibility of claiming that scientific knowledge is what remains when a theory's falsehoods have been expunged. Knowledge requires truth.
And there seems to be no feasible way to get good scientific theories to come out true. So knowledge is not the cognitive condition that good science standardly engenders. We seem forced to admit that scientific accounts that contain falsehoods nonetheless constitute cognitive achievements. If so, to understand the cognitive contribution of science, knowledge is not the epistemic magnitude we should focus on. Science regularly reveals that things that are superficially alike are deeply different and things that are superficially different are deeply alike. Without an adequate system of categories, significant likenesses and differences would be missed.
Scale is critical. As Nancy Cartwright's discussion of Simpson's paradox shows, factors that are salient or important at one level of generality can be unimportant at another.
The graduate school at Berkeley was accused of discriminating against women. . . . The accusation appeared to be borne out in the probabilities: The probability of acceptance was much higher for men than for women. Bicknell, Hammel, and O'Connell looked at the data more carefully, however, and discovered that this was no longer so if they partitioned by department. In a majority of the eighty-five departments, the probability of admission for women was just about the same as for men, and in some even higher for women than for men. . . .
[W]omen tended to apply to departments with high rejection rates, so that department by department women were admitted in about the same ratios as men but across the whole university considerably fewer women, by proportion, were admitted. does not consist wholly of H2O. To obtain pure samples of the focal substance requires filtering out impurities. The justification for calling the liquids 'water' and identifying water with H2O is not fidelity, but fruitfulness. Our scientific purposes are served by this characterization. Sometimes, the effects of the impurities are negligible, so we can treat the naturally occurring liquid as if it were H2O. In other cases they are non-negligible. Even then, though, H2O serves as a least common denominator. We compare divergent samples in terms of how and how far they differ from 'pure water' --that is, H2O. There is nothing dishonest about using a description that focuses on H2O. But it would be equally accurate to simply describe the liquid in the rain barrel, the lake and the river more fully. Instead of characterizing them as impure water, we could simply supply the chemical, biological and mineral profile of the liquid in Walden Pond, the liquid in the Charles River, and the liquid that fell in today's storm. Although the latter descriptions would be accurate, they would mask the common core. Treating the three samples as instances of a single substance differing only in impurities highlights features they share.
And by seeing what they share we can begin to investigate their differences. Why are the impurities in one sample, e.g., the water from Walden
Pond, so different from the impurities in another, the water from the Charles River?
This pattern is widespread. Astronomers describe the motions of the planets in terms of regular geometric orbits with perturbations. Linguists describe verbal behavior as rule-based competence overlaid with performance errors. Engineers describe the output of a sensor as a combination of signal and noise. In all such cases the focal concept serves as a point of reference. What occurs in the domain is understood by reference to, and in terms of deviations from, the focus.
Although these examples exhibit the same conceptual configuration, the differences between them are significant. Where it is a matter of signal and noise, only the focal element -the signal --is important.
It is often both possible and desirable to sharpen the signal and eliminate or dampen the effects of the noise.
We fine tune our measuring devices or statistical techniques to eliminate static and highlight focal features.
In cases where noise is ineliminable, it is simply ignored. What counts as signal and what counts as noise varies with interests. Ordinarily, when someone answers questions, the content of the answers is the signal.
But in some psychology experiments, content is mere noise. The signal is reaction time. Psychologists want
to ascertain not what a subject answers, but how long it takes her to answer, for reaction time affords evidence about psychological and neurological processes. The choice of a focus is thus purpose relative.
We cannot always ignore complications. If we want to understand language acquisition, we cannot simply overlook performance errors. We need to see how or whether they affect what is learned. If we want to send a probe to Mars, we cannot simply ignore the planet's deviation from a perfect elliptical orbit. We must accommodate it in our calculations. In such cases, we employ a schema and correction model. We start with the focal concept and introduce elaborations to achieve the type and level of accuracy we require.
All these cases involve streamlining the focus and sidelining or downplaying complexities.
Sometimes, as in the model of signal and noise, the complexities are permanently sidelined. As much as possible, we sharpen the signal and eliminate static. We have no reason to reintroduce the static we have removed. In other cases, when the model of schema and correction is appropriate, complexities may be set aside only temporarily. They may need to be reintroduced at a later stage.
Focal points are readily defined. The choice among them turns on utility, not just accuracy. Three points described by Dennett illustrate this: The center of gravity is 'the point at which the whole weight of a body may be considered to act, if the body is situated in a uniform gravitational field'.
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The center of population of the United States is 'the mathematical point at the intersection of the two lines such that there are as many inhabitants north as south of the latitude and as many inhabitants east as west of the longitude'. 8 Dennett's lost sock center is 'the center of the smallest sphere that can be inscribed around all the socks' that Dennett has ever lost. Gravity is a fundamental force whose effects are uniform, law governed, and ubiquitous. It is often simpler, both conceptually and computationally, to represent an extended body as a point mass located at the body's center of gravity, and to calculate, predict, and explain gravitational effects of and on the body as though it were a point mass located at the center of gravity. The center of gravity is a manifestly useful device of representation. It is critical that the focus need not occur naturally. Laboratory processes may be required to obtain a refined, pure sample of a focal substance like H2O. Computational processes may be required to fix the population points that best display important demographic trends. Sensor readings are subjected to statistical analyses to synthesize the information we seek. In yet other cases conceptual processing is called for. To understand grammatical errors it may be helpful to subject an utterance to a sort of conceptual factor analysis, construing it as consisting of invariable grammatical rules overlaid with idiosyncratic applications.
The focus of representation may be fairly distant from the robust phenomena it bears on.
We construct devices of representation to serve certain purposes and can reconstruct them both to enable them to better serve their original purposes and to serve other purposes that we may subsequently form. We can revise the scope, scale, and content of our representations to improve their capacity to promote our evolving cognitive ends. In such matters there are feedback loops. As we come to understand 
(d), (e), and (f). Although it instantiates (a), (b) and (c), it is unlikely in normal scientific contexts to exemplify any of them.
A sample then is a symbol that refers to some of the properties it instantiates. It thereby affords a measure of epistemic access to these properties. Epistemic access can be better or worse. One reason for careful sampling is to insure that the sample has the properties of interest; another is to obtain a sample that affords ready epistemic access to them. Some factors occur only in minute quantities in pond water, so although a liter of water drawn from the pond exemplifies them, they may still be hard to detect. Moreover, such a sample may include confounding factors, which although unexemplified and (for current purposes) irrelevant, impede epistemic access to exemplified properties. So instead of working with samples drawn directly from nature, scientists often process samples to amplify features of interest and/or remove confounding factors. In the lab, the water sample undergoes purification processes to remove unwanted material. What results is a pure sample in which the features of interest stand out. Scientists then experiment on this sample, and devise explanations and predictions based on its behavior. Although the lab specimen does not occur naturally in the form in which it is tested, the tests are not a sham. For the features the specimen exemplifies do occur naturally. The lab specimen's divergence from nature in exemplified features is neglible; its divergence in other respects is irrelevant.
Different sorts of samples are suited to different experiments. Scientists might experiment on a random sample of a substance, a purposeful sample, or a purified sample. In all such cases, the goal is to understand nature. An experiment is designed to reveal something directly about the sample, which can be projected back onto the natural phenomena it bears on. Just how to project from the lab to the world depends on the sort of sample used, and the operative assumptions about how it relates to the phenomena whose features it exemplifies. The extrapolation is not always strightforward. A good deal of interpretation may be required to effect the projection.
To determine whether a substance S is carcinogenic, investigators place genetically identical mice in otherwise identical environments, exposing half of them to massive doses of S while leaving the rest unexposed. The common genetic endowment and otherwise identical environments neutralize the vast array of genetic and environmental factors that are believed to standardly influence the incidence of cancer. By controlling for genetics and most aspects of the environment, scientists insure that these factors, although instantiated by the mice, are not exemplified. They arrange things so that exposure or non-exposure to S is the only environmental feature exemplified, thereby enabling the experiment to disclose the effects of S.
The use of mice is grounded in the assumption that, in the respects that matter, mice are no different from humans. Given this assumption, the experiment is interpreted as exemplifying the effect on mammals, not just on mice. The mice are exposed to massive doses of S, on the assumption that the effect of lots of S on small mammals over a short period is reflective of the effect of small amounts of S on larger mammals over a long period. So the experiment is interpreted as exemplifying the effect of S rather than just the effect of high doses of S. To make its cognitive contribution, of course, experiment must be properly interpreted. If we took the experimental situation to replicate life in the wild, we would be badly mistaken. But if the background assumptions are sound, then we understand the ways the experiment is and is not representative of nature -that is, we understand what aspects of the experiment symbolize and how they do so. That enables the experiment to advance understanding of the effect of S on mammals.
The experiment is highly artificial. Even the mice are artifacts, having been intentionally bred to exhibit a certain genetic structure. The exposure is to a vastly higher dose of S than would occur in nature.
The environment is rigidly controlled to eliminate a huge array of factors that normally affect the health of mice. The experiment eliminates some ordinary aspects of mouse life, such as the dangers to life and limb that predators pose. It nullifies the effects of others, such as the genetic diversity of members of a wild population of mice. It exaggerates others, exposing the mice to much higher doses of S than they would be exposed to naturally. Rather than rendering the experiment unrepresentative, these divergences from nature enable the experiment to reveal aspects of nature that are normally overshadowed. They clear away the confounding features and highlight the significant ones so that the effects of S on mammals stand out.
Science distances itself even further from the phenomena when it resorts to models, idealizations, and thought experiments. Scientific models are schematic representations that highlight significant features while prescinding from irrelevant complications. They may be relatively austere, neglecting fine grained features of the phenomena they concern. They may be caricatures, exaggerating features to bring subtle but important consequences to light. 10 They may be radically incomplete, representing only selected aspects of the phenomena.
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Strictly and literally, they describe nothing in the world. For example, although financial transactions are complexes of rational and irrational behavior, economics devises and deploys models that screen off all factors deemed irrational, regardless of how large a role they play in actual transactions. Such models would provide nothing like accurate representations of real transactions, but would not be defective on that account. They operate on the assumption that for certain purposes irrationality can safely be ignored.
Construed literally, models may describe ideal cases that do not, perhaps cannot, occur in nature.
The ideal gas is a model that represents gas molecules as perfectly elastic, dimensionless spheres that exhibit no mutual attraction. There are --indeed there could be --no such molecules. But the model captures the interdependence of temperature, pressure, and volume that is crucial to understanding the behavior of actual gases. Explanations that adduced the ideal gas would be epistemically unacceptable if abject fidelity to truth were required. Since helium molecules are not dimensionless, mutually indifferent, elastic spheres, an account that represents them as such is false. But, at least if the explanation concerns the behavior of helium in circumstances where divergence from the ideal gas law is negligible (roughly, where temperature is high and pressure is low) scientists are apt to find it unexceptionable. For in such circumstances, the effects of friction, attraction, and molecular size do not matter. Models of economic growth represent the profit rate as constant. In fact, it is not. Non-economic factors such as epidemics, corruption, and political unrest interfere. But by bracketing such complications, the economic models capture features that are common to a host of seemingly disparate situations. Even though the full blooded situations seem very different from one another, the model presents a common core and enables economists to (partially) explain seemingly disparate behaviors in terms of that core. Thus representations that are and are known to be inaccurate afford insight into the phenomena they purport to concern.
Thought experiments are imaginative representations designed to reveal what would happen if certain conditions were met. They are not actual, and often not even possible, experiments. Nonetheless, they afford an understanding of the phenomena they pertain to. By considering the experience of a person riding on an elevator with and without the presence of a gravitational field, Einstein shows the equivalence of gravitational and inertial mass. By considering how a light body tethered to a heavy body would fall, Galileo both discredits the Aristotelian theory motion and discovers that the rate at which objects in a vacuum fall is independent of their weight. In other cases, thought experiments flesh out theories by revealing what would happen in the limit. By considering how electrical currents would behave in metals cooled to absolute zero, a computer simulation yields insights into superconductivity. The effectiveness of a thought experiment is not undermined by the fact that the imaginary conditions that set the stage never obtain.
Standardly, philosophers assume that scientific theories aim at truth, and are deficient if they are not true. Even good theories confront anomalies. But anomalies are indications that theories are defective. So the existence of anomalies does not in itself discredit the standard view. Although idealizations, simplified models, and thought experiments neither are nor purport to be true, they are not defective. To account for the cognitive contributions of science, epistemology must accommodate their contributions. Such devices, I
believe, function as fictions. So to make my case, I need to explain first how fictions advance understanding and then why it is reasonable to consider these devices fictions.
It is not unusual to emerge from an encounter with a work of fiction feeling that one has learned something. But fictions do not purport to be true. So the learning, whatever it is, cannot plausibly be construed as the acquisition of reliable information. Since fiction is indifferent to literal truth, falsity is no defect in it. A fiction need not be 'realistic'. It can transcend the limits of the possible. It can portray characters with unusual combinations of traits and situations that present unusual challenges and opportunities. It can contrive telling mismatches between characters and their situations. It can uproot characters from one environment and implant them in another. Having done such things, it plays out the consequences. If thought experiments, models and idealizations are fictions, they do the same sorts of things. Like other fictions, they are exempt from the truth requirement. So the fact that the ideal gas law is true of nothing in the world is not a mark against it. The fact that no one ever has ridden and no one ever will ride in an elevator without a gravitational field does not discredit Einstein's thought experiment. If they are fictions, such devices are not supposed to be true. But they are not completely idle speculations either.
The consequences they play out are supposed to advance understanding of the actual. The question is: If a fictional representation is not true, how can it shed light on the way the world actually is?
I suggest that it does so by exemplifying features that diverge (at most) negligibly from the phenomena it concerns.
divergence is negligible depends on a host of contextual factors. A divergence that is negligible in one context may be nonnegligible in another. Since we know how to accommodate the contextual factors, we are in a position to interpret the exemplars correctly.
A fiction exemplifies certain features, thereby affording epistemic access to them. It enables us to discern and distinguish those features, study different aspects of them, consider their causes and consequences. It is apt to be purposely contrived to bring to the fore factors that are ordinarily Experiments using a purified sample yield insights into their natural counterparts only if we haven't filtered out significant factors. Studying the properties of a random sample yields insight into the material sampled only if the randomly taken sample is in fact suitably representative. If we randomly select an unrepresentative sample, we will project the wrong features onto the domain. All scientific reasoning takes place against background assumptions. That is the source of both its power and its vulnerability.
To construe a model as a fiction is to treat it as a symbolic construct that exemplifies features it shares with the phenomena it models but diverges from those phenomena in other, unexemplified, respects.
A tinker-toy model of a protein exemplifies structural relations it shares with the protein. It does not exemplify its color, size or material. So its failure to replicate the color, size, and material of the protein it models is not a defect. Indeed, it is an asset. Being larger, color-coded, and durable, it is able to make the features it exemplifies manifest so that they can be discerned more easily than they are when we observe proteins directly.
The explanation of the cognitive contribution of fictions in science is that in recognizable and significant respects their divergence from the phenomena they bear on is negligible. I suggest that the same thing accounts for the cognitive contributions of otherwise good theories that contain anomalies. We say that they are right 'up to a point'. That point, I suggest, is where the divergence becomes nonnegligible.
Just as an ensemble of gas molecules nearly satisfies the ideal gas law, the motion of a slowly moving nearby object nearly satisfies Newton's laws. In both cases, the laws provide an orientation for investigating where, how, why, and with what consequences divergences occur. 'Negligible' is an elastic term.
Sometimes we are, and should be, prepared to overlook a lot. In the early stages of theory development, very rough approximations and very incomplete models afford a modest understanding of the domain. With the advancement of science we raise our standards, refine our models, and often require a better fit with the facts. That is one way we improve our understanding of what is going on. A closer fit does not always afford a better understanding. Sometimes a stark, streamlined model that cuts through irrelevant complications is more revealing. When a point mass at the center of gravity is an effective way to conceptualize and compute the effects of gravity, a more realistic representation that specifies the actual dimensions of the planets would not obviously be preferable. The fact that in certain respects it is as if the planets were point masses is an interesting and important fact about gravitational attraction. In effect, what I am suggesting is that a theory that is known to be inadequate is consigned to the realm of fiction. It is treated as if it were an idealization. But fictions in science are cognitively significant, so to construe even our best theories as fictions is not to devalue them. approximations, simplified models, and thought experiments do not directly mirror reality. But because they have testable implications they are empirically defeasible. That is, there are determinate, epistemically accessible situations which, if found to obtain, would discredit the theories. If we discovered, as we could, that friction plays a major role in collisions between gas molecules, that discovery would discredit the ideal gas law and the theories that incorporate it. Pseudoscientific accounts are indefeasible. No evidence could discredit them. They cannot claim to reveal the way the world is, since they would, by their own lights, hold regardless of how the world turns out to be. This is a critical difference and shows that scientific theories that incorporate fictive devices are nonetheless empirical.
I have urged that science is riddled with symbols that neither do nor purport to directly mirror the phenomena they concern. Purified, contrived lab specimens, extreme experimental situations, simplified models, and highly counterfactual thought experiments contribute to a scientific understanding of the way the world is. I suggested that science's reliance on such devices shows that veritism is inadequate to the epistemology of science. But, one might argue, such devices play only a causal role. They enable scientists to discover the way things are. And perhaps it is significant that non-truths can do that. Nevertheless, epistemology is not primarily concerned with the causes of our beliefs, so the use of such devices does not discredit veritism. The crucial question is whether the conclusions that emerge from the deployment of these devices are true. If so, veritism is vindicated, for the role played by the untruths is causal but not constitutive of scientific cognition.
This strikes me as wrong. The devices do not just cause an understanding of the phenomena they concern, they embody that understanding. Their design and deployment is enmeshed with an understanding of the phenomena they bear on and the proper ways to investigate it. Without that understanding the laboratory experiments, models, thought experiments and samples would not only be unmotivated, they would be unintelligible. We would have no idea what to make of them. Without some constraints on the imaginative exercise, we would have no idea what to imagine when invited to imagine what a person riding on a light wave would see. Moreover, we do not just use the devices as vehicles to generate conclusions, we think of the domain in terms of them. We represent the contents of lakes as water with impurities, the interaction of gas molecules as comporting with the ideal gas law, the orbits of the planets as perturbed ellipses. Because we do so, we are in a position to draw inferences that both test and extend our understanding.
There is a further worry: The only constraint on acceptability I have mentioned is that a theory must answer to the evidence. But a theory that included 'All planets except Mercury have elliptical orbits' would do that. Among the theories that answer to the same body of evidence, some are better than others. What makes the difference? Unfortunately, the question cannot be settled by appeal to obvious, a priori criteria.
Apart from consistency, there are none. With the advancement of understanding, we revise our views about what makes a theory good, and thus our criteria of acceptability. Elsewhere I have argued that epistemic acceptability is a matter of reflective equilibrium: The components of an acceptable theory -statements of fact, fictions, categories, methods, etc. --must be reasonable in light of one another, and the theory as a whole must be at least as reasonable as any available alternative in light of our relevant antecedent commitments.
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This is not the place to review that argument. My point here is that because such an epistemology does not privilege literal, factual truths, it can accommodate the complex symbolization that mature science exhibits.
To understand a theory is to properly interpret its symbols. This requires distinguishing factual from fictional sentences, accommodating tacit presuppositions, accurately interpreting the scope and selectivity of exemplars and so forth. To understand a domain in terms of a theory is to be in a position to recognize, Harvard University
